Recently published paper by Gosnell and Tavoni examines climate change negotiations and how heterogeneity in wealth (poor vs. rich countries) as well as bargaining (in the form of making binding side deals) affect whether or not countries (represented by a participant) can achieve a target level of emissions. The authors find that 100% of groups achieve their targets by the 4th round when wealth is homogenous. While the same is not true when wealth is heterogeneous, the authors do find that side deals among rich individuals are more binding for "successful" groups than "unsuccessful" groups under both the PSD and ASD (see treatment acronym and definition below).
Their paper can be downloaded at link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-1975-3.
Anna is an applied microeconomist interested in the relationship between human behavior and economic decision-making. She works primarily on environmental and natural resource topics using experimental, behavioral, survey and spatial datasets. This blog was created for the sole purpose of archiving and sharing interesting articles and ideas.